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Abstract—Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have an economic
and operational interest in detecting malicious network activity
relating to their subscribers. However, it is unclear what kind
of traffic data an ISP has available for cyber-security research,
and under which legal conditions it can be used. This paper
gives an overview of the challenges posed by legislation and of
the data sources available to a European ISP. DNS and NetFlow
logs are identified as relevant data sources and the state of the
art in anonymization and fingerprinting techniques is discussed.
Based on legislation, data availability and privacy considerations,
a practically applicable anonymization policy is presented.
Index Terms—ISP, privacy, DNS, NetFlow, IPFIX, cyber-
security, anonymization
I. INTRODUCTION
Research in cyber-security is highly dependent on the
availability of real-life traffic traces for a number of different
purposes. When collecting these traffic traces, researchers and
practitioners should consider aspects like legal requirements
and the privacy risk involved. However, these topics may
not be within the researchers’ area of knowledge. This can
have a number of undesirable consequences like increased
project lead time, legal problems when sharing project data, or
spending time on research that is irrelevant because it cannot
be applied in practice. The purpose of this paper is to help
researchers and practitioners avoid some of these pitfalls when
collecting data at an ISP level.
To protect the privacy of the subscribers, European ISP
legislation forbids the use of certain data, and sets anonymiza-
tion requirements on data usage, requirements that also apply
to positive use cases like cyber-security research. However,
the legislation does not present which specific anonymization
techniques must be used for specific data sources. Some
studies of anonymization techniques and privacy risks focus
broadly rather than on giving practical guidelines for specific
use cases. Other studies investigate how specific data sources
can present a privacy problem in different use cases, but do
not consider if the data is already unavailable from a legal
perspective or how to mitigate the privacy risk.
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In this paper, we firstly identify the ISP data sources legally
and technically available for research. Furthermore, we present
a practically applicable and privacy-preserving anonymization
policy, for NetFlow and DNS logs, that complies with the rel-
evant ISP legislation. This allows researchers and developers
to start with a focus on implementation rather than legislation
when creating solutions targeted for ISP deployments.
This paper is organised in seven sections. Section II gives
an introduction to the relevant legislation and anonymization
requirements, and Section III provides an overview of the data
sources often technically available to an ISP. Having limited
the relevant scope to two data sources, Section IV presents
related work on anonymization techniques and on subscriber
fingerprinting based on anonymized DNS and NetFlow logs.
Sections V and VI, build upon the knowledge derived from all
previous sections to propose and discuss concrete anonymiza-
tion policies for individual fields in NetFlow and DNS logs,
thus providing the primary contribution of the paper. Lastly,
Section VII summarizes and concludes the paper.
II. LEGISLATION
To identify the legal opportunities and challenges, an
overview of relevant legislation is needed, which will be the
topic of this section.
A. ePrivacy Directive
The ePrivacy Directive [1] from 2002 and the related
national implementations, regulate among other things how
ISPs are allowed to handle data related to the subscribers data
traffic. The 2009 update of the ePrivacy Directive does not
contain any changes relevant to this paper.
Although the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
[2] is newer than the ePrivacy Directive, the latter is considered
lex specialis to the GDPR. This means that the ePrivacy
Directive overrides the GDPR in any situation that is specif-
ically described in the ePrivacy Directive. Furthermore, as
the ePrivacy Directive specifically regulates ISPs and their
handling of subscriber data traffic, the GDPR is considered
out of the scope of this paper.
Articles 5, 6 and 9 in the ePrivacy Directive set the
following limitations relevant to this paper on processing a
subscribers traffic or location data:
• Data already being processed for the purpose of trans-
mission must be made anonymous before additional pro-
cessing.
• Data not being processed for the purpose of transmission
or as part of a value added service cannot be processed.
• Data can be processed for a specific value added service
but only if consent is available.
In the context of this paper, ”processing” means any form of
storage, manipulation, forwarding etc. of customer IP traffic,
location data etc. [2] In addition, ”processing for the pur-
pose of transmission” refers to processing needed to transfer
IP packets (routing, switching), performing DNS lookups
(caching, recursing), authenticating the subscribers, routing
packets to the correct cell tower and similar operations [1].
As it is practically impossible to have all subscribers sign
up to a value added service relating to cyber-security research
(and thereby providing consent), using anonymized data is the
only viable strategy.
B. Opinion on Anonymization Techniques
Various anonymization and pseudonymization techniques
and their relation to the legal framework are described in
”Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymization Techniques” [3]. ”Opin-
ion” documents contain the elaboration of a specific directive
or regulation, and are considered recommendations, not leg-
islation. This specific opinion is written to elaborate on the
anonymization requirements in the Data Protection Directive,
a predecessor to the GDPR, but is still applicable and relevant.
Both the Opinion and recital 26 in the GDPR make a clear
distinction between pseudonymization and anonymization, and
makes it explicit that a requirement from the ePrivacy Direc-
tive to anonymize certain data is not fulfilled by the use of
pseudonymization.
Two main anonymization techniques are described:
• Randomization including noise addition and permutation
techniques ”alter the veracity of the data in order to re-
move the strong link between the data and the individual”.
As an example, an IP address (A) in a specific data record
can be substituted with a random IP address (B), and
the same IP address (A) in another data record can be
substituted with a different random IP address (C).
• Generalization including aggregation (k-anonymity), L-
diversity and T-closeness techniques ”generalize, or di-
lute, the attributes of data subjects by modifying the
respective scale or order of magnitude”. As an example,
the IP addresses in all data records can be replaced by a
smaller IP prefix.
The differential privacy technique is also described, but as this
technique requires the original data to be retained, this tech-
nique is not compliant with the anonymization requirement of
the ePrivacy Directive.
The Opinion concludes that in most cases it is not possible
to give minimum recommendations for parameters to use as
each data set needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
C. Summary
The ePrivacy Directive mandates that only data already
being processed by the ISP for the purpose of transmission can
be used for cyber-security research, and the data can only be
retained in an anonymized form. The Opinion on Anonymiza-
tion Techniques details which anonymization techniques are
considered compliant. The specific data sources to be used for
cyber-security research must therefore be determined before
further anonymization considerations can be made.
III. DATA SOURCES
The restrictions posed by legislation depends on the type of
data that is to be processed. In this section, the data sources
available to Telenor Denmark will be described as a repre-
sentative example of data sources being generally available to
an ISP. Table I summarizes the data sources, their content and
their usage restrictions based on the presentation of legislation
in section II. This will provide an overview of which data
sources are both legally and technically available for cyber-
security research, which can help researchers determine if their
research can be applied legally in practice.
The data sources that require anonymization are described in
more detail in the following sections. Note that all data sources
containing personal identifiable information like IP addresses
require anonymization or consent to be used. Omitted are
those that are not relevant in relation to Internet cyber-
security research, thus excluding for example the SMS/MMS
service and non-Internet based telephony services. Section
III-D summarizes and discusses possible use cases for the
available logs.
A. Identity of the subscriber
a) IP assignment log: Assigning an IP address to a
subscriber is handled by different components depending on
the access type (DSL/fiber/coax/mobile). Each component
can, however, create an accounting log entry containing the
subscriber identity (DSL-number or IMSI) and the assigned/re-
voked IP address. In a Telenor Denmark context, the DSL-
number is a 4-6 digit broadband customer identifier that
(despite the name) enumerates both coax, fiber and DSL
customers.
b) CGNAT log: If mobile subscribers are assigned pri-
vate IP addresses, Carrier Grade Network Address Translation
(CGNAT) functionality is used. CGNAT can operate just like
regular Network Address Translation (NAT) except that the
NAT is performed at the ISP premises rather than at the
customer premises. Multiple customers thereby share the same
public IP. The Telenor Denmark CGNAT device reserves a
range of 64 ports (a ”port block”) to each private IP address.
Upon assigning/revoking this port block, a CGNAT log entry
is created containing private IP address, public IP address
and port block. Notice that a log entry is not created for
each TCP/UDP session, it is only created for each port
block allocation. The use of NAT logs can be relevant when
distinguishing between different mobile subscribers sharing
the same IP address.
Name Usage restriction Contents
IP assignment log Anonymized IP address, IMSI/IMEI/DSL-number
CGNAT log Anonymized Private/public IP address, port block
Customer database Contract/consent Person name, geographical address, IMSI/DSL-number
Modem/router at customer Contract/consent Attached device name, MAC and IP
EPDG CDR log Anonymized IP address, IMSI, RAT type (WiFi)
Cell database None Geographical address, gain/height/tilt etc.
Mobility event log Anonymized IMSI/IMEI, RAT type, cell ID
NetFlow log Anonymized TCP/UDP/IP session information
DNS log Anonymized Source IP address and port, queried domain name and response
Layer 3-7 DPI Contract/consent IP address, malware type
PGW application log Contract/consent IMSI/IMEI, IP address, layer 7 specific information
PGW flow log Contract/consent IMSI/IMEI, TCP/UDP/IP session and layer 7 application enumeration
TABLE I
ISP data sources relevant for cyber-security research
c) EPDG CDR log: In order to use Voice-over-WiFi
service the mobile phone must create an IpSec tunnel towards
the Evolved Packet Data Gateway (EPDG). The EPDG can
create a log line containing the IMSI and the source IP
address of the IpSec tunnel. This log is known as a Call
Data Record (CDR), despite the fact that it is not the phone
call, but the tunnel establishment that is logged. This provides
two interesting pieces of information: First the fact that a
phone is attached to WiFi rather than being completely offline.
Second, it shows which broadband subscription the mobile
phone is connecting from. This can be used to distinguish
between an infected broadband subscriber and an infected
mobile subscriber using a broadband subscriber’s WiFi.
B. Mobile location
a) Cell Database: Information about the geographical
location, frequency, antenna gain/height/tilt, topography etc.
of all cells is available in a central database. This can be used
to estimate the coverage area of a specific cell.
b) Mobility event log: Phone mobility on 4G is handled
by the Mobility Management Entity (MME) component, and
this component can create a log line for each mobility event
containing the subscriber identity (IMSI/IMEI), the destination
cell identity (a 5-6 digit number) and the destination Radio
Access Technology (RAT, 2G/3G/4G).
C. Internet activity
a) NetFlow log: The routers of the backbone network
can emit NetFlow/IPFIX records. Most ISPs have equipment
capable of doing this, but the specific implementation varies.
ISPs may emit NetFlow logs from all routers or no routers,
and may use varying levels of sampling/aggregation.
b) DNS log: Most subscribers (both mobile and broad-
band) use the ISP’s DNS resolvers for name resolution. A log
entry can, depending on the logging method, contain the client
source IP/port, the query and the response. The authoritative
DNS servers are considered less relevant for the topic of this
paper, as traffic from ISP subscribers will in most cases be
visible at the DNS resolvers as well.
D. Summary
This section outlines the different data sources available
to Telenor Denmark as an example of a typical ISP, and
identifies if consent or anonymization is required for data
usage. Specifically for cyber-security research, the point of
focus is the Internet activity (described by DNS and NetFlow
logs) rather than the location or the subscriber identity. The
DNS and NetFlow logs must be anonymized before use, and
this is the topic of the rest of the paper.
IV. RELATED WORK
The previous sections argue that of the data sources tech-
nically and legally available to an ISP, NetFlow and DNS
logs are the most interesting to cyber-security research. Having
limited the scope, it is now relevant to identify existing, related
work on DNS and NetFlow anonymization and fingerprinting.
First, we provide a few notes on terminology and a general
overview of related work. Afterwards, we discuss relevant
papers in NetFlow and DNS respectively.
A. Terminology and overview
Many papers describe topics relating to anonymization,
privacy and fingerprinting, so in order to discern which papers
are the most relevant, an introductory note on terminology and
preconditions is needed:
• Aggregation vs. generalization: Some papers use the
terms generalization and aggregation interchangeably or
with different definitions. For this paper, the terminology
applied in RFC6235 will be used [4], and only general-
ization approaches are considered to preserve utility.
• Anonymization vs. pseudonymization: A brief look
at existing literature, including taxonomy papers,
shows that the distinction between anonymization and
pseudonymization required by legislation is not often
used, as typically the term ”anonymization” is used for
pseudonymization techniques as well.
• Anonymization must be applied before data analysis:
Some techniques such as (k,j)-obfuscation [5] are based
on a statistical analysis of the entire data set to be
obfuscated, thus requiring all data to be stored in a non-
anonymized form prior to release, which is not in line
with legal requirements.
The goal of this paper is to provide a DNS and NetFlow
anonymization policy stating which anonymization technique
should be applied for individual protocol fields, while taking
Related Work
Aspect 3 4,6 7 8,9,10,11 12 13 14 15
NetFlow or DNS X X X X X X
Anon. techniques X X X X X
Protocol fields X X X X
Privacy risk X X X X X
Legislation X X
TABLE II
Notable related work and aspects in focus
the privacy risk and ISP related legislation into consideration
when focusing on the cyber-security research use case. Related
works cover some but not all of these aspects, as illustrated
by Table II.
B. NetFlow
A good introduction to the topic of passive internet mea-
surement in general, including many aspects ranging from
a legal overview to lessons learned on various practical de-
ployment work is written by the authors of [7]. One of the
lessons learned is that considering legislative aspects is a time
consuming and complicated process, a problem that this paper
attempts to address.
RFC 6235 provides a thorough walk-through of anonymiza-
tion and pseudonymization options for the individual fields
of the IPFIX protocol [4]. The paper categorizes various
anonymization techniques into different classes, however, only
the classes named ”generalization” (such as truncation) or
”set substitution” (such as noise addition) can be considered
anonymization rather than pseudonymization techniques [3].
The paper does not provide any specific suggestions such as
the length to be used for IP address truncation or on how much
the precision of a timestamp should be degraded.
A comprehensive survey of anonymization techniques and
25 tools is written by the authors of [6]. The paper also
discusses the relevance of anonymizing different fields in the
different protocol layers in a network packet capture. The
paper concludes with a number of statements like ”The port
number should not be anonymized as it will have a big impact
on the usefulness of a network capture and cannot be directly
used for identification” [6] and ”Currently, in an environment
without completely trusted parties, it is not recommended to
share complete anonymized datasets. The current protection
against re-identification is still inadequate.” (due to the large
amount of context available in complete datasets) [6]
C. DNS
Two papers show that it is possible to perform user finger-
printing based on the domain name part of DNS logs [8], [9].
However, no suggestions on how to anonymize the DNS logs
in data storage / mining environments are provided.
The authors of [11] describe the best privacy practices for
DNS operators. Authenticity and confidentiality mechanisms
like DNSSEC and DNS-over-TLS are described, but the
section detailing how to protect data at rest focuses mainly on
data minimization, IP address anonymization and TCP/TLS
related features.
The implications of using only requests for the top n most
popular host names for identity fingerprinting, as well as using
only requests for anything but the n most popular host names
is discussed by the authors of [8]. This is relevant in the
context of cyber-security research as this idea can be used
for data minimization, thus decreasing the privacy risk.
Bloom filters [16] rely on hash functions to store domain
names in an irreversible way. While this provides good privacy,
it also reduces the utility of the stored data, as data can then
only be used to search for already known malware related
domain names. This excludes for example domain names
created by a Domain Generation Algorithm. While this can be
sufficient from an operational perspective, it is less interesting
to a cyber-security researcher, and therefore Bloom filters will
not be considered further in this paper.
D. Summary
Related work does not provide a concrete answer on how
an anonymization policy could be implemented, but does
provide some good directions. The most specific input to
an anonymization policy is provided by RFC 6235, which
suggests specific techniques like truncation, but not directions
on the truncation length. Based on these directions, section
V and VI will provide a suggestion for a legally compliant
anonymization policy suitable for ISP cyber-security research.
V. NETFLOW ANONYMIZATION POLICY
Based on the directions offered by legislation and related
work on anonymization of NetFlow described in the pre-
vious sections, this section will provide a suggestion for a
legally compliant anonymization policy suitable for ISP cyber-
security research. The section describes the choice of protocol
field/features, elaborates on the choice of anonymization tech-
nique for the individual fields, and concludes by providing the
pseudo-code implementing such a policy.
A. Choice of features
The IPFIX features most typically used for cyber-security
research [17] are listed in Table III along with the suggested
anonymization policy. ICMP type/code and TCP flags are
also added to table. The following paragraphs describe the
considerations for each field noted in the table.
B. Feature anonymization details
a) Total bytes and packets: The total count of bytes and
packets in a TCP/UDP session can be used for user profiling
and for attacks against other anonymization techniques [4].
Moreover, it can under some circumstances be used as part of
an algorithm to determine which web sites are visited [15].
The discussion may, however, be less important in practice,
as NetFlows are typically sampled 1:n when collected by an
ISP for performance reasons. The sampling also automatically
provides a precision degradation of packet and byte counts,
which is considered a valid method of anonymization for that
field [4]. From a performance perspective, network equipment
vendors consider n <= 512 a very low sample rate. This
Field Technique Specifics
Bytes/packets Precision degradation NetFlow 1:n sampling
Start/end time Reverse truncation Remove AM/PM info
IP addr.(no NAT) Truncation Truncate to /24 prefix
IP addr.(CGNAT) None -
IP addr.(Infrastr.) None -
IP addr.(external) Truncation Truncate to /16 prefix
IP protocol Binning TCP+UDP+ICMP/”other”
ICMP type+code None -
Port (no NAT) None -
Port (CGNAT) Truncation Truncate to /2 prefix
Port (Infrastr.) None -
Port (external) None -
TCP flags None -
TABLE III
NetFlow anonymization policy assuming 64 port block based CGNAT
order of magnitude for sampling seems likely to be sufficient
for anonymization purposes although to the best of our knowl-
edge, no research has been conducted on quantifying this.
b) IP addresses: The authors of [10] conclude that if
any other type of IP address anonymization technique than
truncation is applied, re-identification of a host in NetFlow
traffic is possible when active fingerprinting techniques are
applied. If IP address truncation is applied, other fields may
still be able to identify the host, though.
Fig. 1. Classification of IP addresses
From the perspective of an ISP capturing NetFlow at the
border routers, 4 different categories of IP addresses are
relevant to describe separately, as illustrated in Figure 1:
Some Provider Assigned (PA) IP addresses are allocated
directly to subscriber equipment (typically broadband routers
at customer premises), some PA IP addresses are allocated
for use on the outside of the CGNAT device and some PA
IP addresses are allocated to ISP infrastructure, including the
DNS servers, content caches, routers etc. IP addresses outside
the ISP/provider realm (more specifically IP addresses not
announced through Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) by the
ISP outside the ISPs Autonomous System (AS)) will simply
be referred to as ”external” IP addresses.
Whether PA and external IP addresses should be subjected
to the same truncation length is discussed in [12] based on a
”risk vs. utility” analysis. Choosing the ”sweet spot” with the
most utility preserved, this would be equivalent to truncating
PA IP addresses to their /24 prefix and external IP addresses
to their /16 prefix.
Truncation of prefixes is considered an implementation of
k-anonymity [3]. Extensions to k-anonymity like l-diversity
and t-closeness require an analysis of the data distribution
before anonymization. These extensions are therefore not
immediately implementable in practice.
c) Timestamps: Several papers discuss host fingerprint-
ing based on ICMP Timestamp Requests/Replies and the TCP
Timestamp option, as these contain a timestamp that originates
from the host. However, neither DNS or NetFlow logs contain
a host originated timestamp, as only the timestamps from the
NetFlow/DNS log capture devices are logged. This timestamp
can be used in an injection attack to identify a host in a traffic
trace with pseudonymized (permuted) IP addresses [13].
In the case where only one subscriber in a truncated IP
prefix is actively generating traffic at a specific period of time
(e.g., during nighttime), this subscriber does not benefit from
IP address truncation. To preserve anonymity, the precision
of the timestamp could be reduced to for example an hour
or a minute. These approaches are typically infeasible for
research, as the order of events is not preserved. An approach
not described by the authors of [4] or other known sources is to
simply remove AM/PM information from the timestamp. This
approach has the advantage compared to traditional precision
reduction that the order of all interrelated NetFlow/DNS events
that do not cross the AM/PM time boundary is preserved.
d) IP protocol: The IP header protocol field is not
considered privacy sensitive by any known papers, the authors
of [6] even omit the discussion of the field entirely. RFC 6235
suggests using the binning technique such that 4 bins are used:
TCP, UDP, ICMP and ”all other protocols”, an approach which
seems suitable for cyber-security research as well.
e) ICMP type/code: ICMP messages and their payload
are widely used for OS fingerprinting by tools such as Nmap.
The methods typically involve differentiating using TTL or
some other IP field, however a specific method creates ICMP
requests using illegal combinations of type and code values,
and the ICMP response code can then in some cases reveal
the OS family [18]. To anonymize this, the code field could
be omitted from the logs. However, doing so comes with
a significant drawback, as it will obviously also hide any
malware using the technique for OS detection.
Note that when using NetFlow logs from an ISP, the
OS family revealed will typically not reveal the end users’
operating system. Instead, it will reveal either the OS family of
the subscribers’ modem/router/firewall or the CGNAT device
deployed by the ISP. Therefore, the reasonable compromise
for cyber-security research seems to be not to anonymize this
field.
f) Ports: The authors of [14] conclude that anonymizing
ports or IP addresses, as opposed to anonymizing other indi-
vidual fields, have the biggest impact on the utility of the data.
However, the risk and the risk/utility trade-off is not discussed
in the paper. Not much research was found that quantifies the
risk of host fingerprinting based on port numbers when IP
addresses are truncated in practice. The authors of [13] provide
a short note describing that injected flow patterns are no longer
recognizable under certain anonymization policies. However,
they do not describe a systematic approach or conclusion for
this. This is likely caused by the fact that much attention
has already been given to properly randomizing TCP port
numbers to avoid Denial-Of-Service and Man-In-The-Middle
attacks [19]. The authors of [6] conclude that the port number
should not be anonymized as it will have a big impact on the
usefulness of a network capture.
g) TCP flags: TCP flags can be used for OS finger-
printing using a technique similar to the one described for
fingerprinting using ICMP type and codes: Specific flags in
a request can trigger an OS-specific flag combination in the
response. Analyzing TCP flags is key in detecting malware
employing DDoS SYN attacks and other attack types.
As with the ICMP type and code, the OS family revealed by
TCP flags will typically not reveal the type of CGNAT device
deployed by the ISP. Therefore, the reasonable compromise
seems to be not to anonymize this field.
h) NAT: Most ISPs implement CGNAT for at least a
subset of their subscribers, so that one IP address contains
traffic from more than one subscriber. Many port allocation
schemes exist, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to
describe all. However, from an anonymization perspective,
two different consequences of introducing CGNAT can be
relevant: decreasing the truncation length of the IP address
and increasing the truncation length of the port.
In a CGNAT scheme where a single RFC6598 IP address
is shared by for example 32 subscribers (5 bits) by random
port assignment, the PA IP address truncation length could
be reduced from a /24 (256 addresses,8 bits) to a /29 (4
addresses,32+5-8=29 prefix) to preserve utility as the expected
amount of hosts grouped will then be the same.
In a scheme where the port allocation is not random, but
based on a range of ports being reserved for a particular host,
or where initially randomly assigned ports are heavily reused
for the same subscriber, the port information must be truncated
using the same methodology as the IP addresses. For example,
if a port block of 64 ports (6 bits) are reserved for each user,
and anonymization equivalent to a /24 IP prefix (256 addresses,
8 bits) is desired, the port number must be reduced to 16-
6-8=2 bits. However, the PA IP address truncation can then
be reduced to a 32+16-6-8=34 prefix, effectively making the
anonymization of the PA IP address unneeded.
C. Pseudo-code: a NetFlow anonymization policy
The pseudo-code listed in Listing 1 implements the
anonymization policy summarized in Table III assuming sam-
pling by the NetFlow emitter. Lines 2-3 remove AM/PM
information, lines 8 and 14 truncate IP addresses to /8 and /16
prefixes, line 10 truncates the port number to a /2 prefix for
customers with NAT (assuming 64 port range based CGNAT).
It is noteworthy that the implementation can be made with
basic operations. This allows a high level of performance,
Listing 1. NetFlow anonymization policy.
1 def anon t imes t amp ( t imes t amp t )
2 i f t . hour >= 1 2 :
3 t . hour = t . hour−12
4 re turn t
5
6 def a n o n i p p o r t ( i n t 3 2 ip , i n t 1 6 p o r t )
7 i f i p in l i s t O f S u b s c r i b e r A s s i g n e d P r e f i x e s :
8 i p = i p & 0xFFFFFF00
9 e l s e i f i p in l i s t O f C G N a t P r e f i x e s :
10 p o r t = p o r t & 0xC000
11 e l s e i f i p in l i s t O f I n f r a s t r u c t P r e f i x e s :
12 / / do n o t h i n g
13 e l s e : / / e x t e r n a l
14 i p = i p & 0xFFFF0000
15 re turn ip , p o r t
16
17 s t a r t t i m e = anon t imes tamp ( s t a r t t i m e )
18 end t ime = anon t imes tamp ( end t ime )
19 s r c i p , s r c p o r t = a n o n i p p o r t ( s r c i p , s r c p o r t )
20 d s t i p , d s t p o r t = a n o n i p p o r t ( d s t i p , d s t p o r t )
21
22 i f p r o t o c o l != ( ICMP or TCP or UDP) :
23 p r o t o c o l = 0
which is required for ISP deployments. Searching for an
IP address in a list of prefixes (lines 7, 9 and 11) should
also be implemented effectively. This is considered trivial,
assuming a small amount of non-overlapping prefixes is used,
and therefore it is omitted for readability. Finally, lines 22-
23 implement binning of protocol information into 4 different
bins.
VI. DNS ANONYMIZATION POLICY
Similar to the previous section but focusing on DNS rather
than NetFlow, this section will provide a suggestion for
a DNS anonymization policy, and provide the pseudo-code
implementing such a policy.
A. Choice of features
The choice of features for DNS based cyber-security re-
search is very diverse [20]. Moreover, whereas NetFlow is only
a format for logging passively collected flow properties, DNS
is a service used (and potentially attacked) by subscribers.
This calls for a more full-featured approach to logging than
focusing on a few specific fields. One example is that a
protocol violation could be made intentionally by a client to
attack the DNS service, and this can only be discovered if the
specific field containing the violation is logged.
A DNS packet typically consists of a header section and
a query section, and response packets also include one or
more sections containing the answer to the query. The answer
sections can contain a number of different resource records
(RRs). The content, typically an IP address or domain name,
and the interpretation of the query and answer RRs depend
on flags in the header as well as on which specific type of
information is queried.
The increased field diversity and inter-dependency makes
DNS log anonymization more complicated than NetFlow log
anonymization: Table IV lists a number of fields for which
Field Anonymization tech. Specifics
Timestamp Reverse truncation As NetFlow
Client IP address As Netflow As NetFlow
Client TCP/UDP port As Netflow As NetFlow
DNS header None -
DNS response TTL Binning 5 predefined bins
TABLE IV
Content independent DNS anonymization policy
Opcode Class Type Domain anon. technique
Not Query - - None
Query Not IN - None
Query IN Common types Minimization
Query IN Uncommon types None
TABLE V
Content based DNS anonymization policy
an anonymization policy can be directly described, whereas
Table V lists the type dependent anonymization techniques.
The lines of the tables are elaborated in the following.
B. Feature anonymization details
a) Timestamp, Client IP address and TCP/UDP port:
For these fields, the anonymization policy also used for the
similar fields NetFlow packets is chosen. To the best of our
knowledge, no research is made that indicates that DNS and
NetFlow logs should be subject to different anonymization
requirements relating to these fields.
b) DNS header: The DNS header consists of a number of
identifiers, response codes and flags. Many of these are needed
to parse the non-header components, and no fields contain
directly personal identifying information. The randomness of
the Message ID has, like the randomness of the TCP/UDP
source port number, been subject to scrutiny to prevent Man-
in-the-Middle attacks, so this field is expected to be properly
randomized to not represent a privacy risk.
c) TTL: The TTL value found in the answer sections of a
DNS packet could, together with the timestamp, be used to de-
termine that two clients requested the same RR, as these would
have the same TTL. Nevertheless, it is unknown whether this
can be practically exploited for subscriber fingerprinting. The
bins [0, 1), [1, 100), [100, 300), [300, 900), [900,∞) are found
to be relevant for cyber-security research [21], and therefore
this technique is chosen.
d) Uncommon opcodes, classes and types: Request and
response messages containing an Opcode of any other value
than ”query” (such as ”status” or ”update”), query messages
of any other class than IN (such as Chaos and Hesiod) and IN
class query messages of any other type than the 15 most com-
mon types (see below) are represented by the first two lines
and the last lines in Table V. A smaller data sample collected at
Telenor Denmark suggests that traffic in these three categories
represent misconfigured equipment, malformed packets and
spurious requests with an empty response. This type of traffic
does not seem to be the result of human Internet usage
behavior and is therefore not likely to represent any privacy
risk. However, as mentioned initially, the traffic may represent
an attack initiated by malware, and therefore the data is still
relevant to retain.
e) Common types: On Telenor Denmark’s resolvers, the
15 most common query types in the IN class are A, AAAA,
A6, CNAME, PTR, MX, TXT, SRV, NAPTR, NS, SOA, DS,
RRSIG, DNSKEY and NSEC3. Resource records of these
types typically consist of a QNAME component (the name
queried) and an RDATA component (the response to the
queried name). Either of these components can contain an IP
address, a domain name or a string of text containing either
of the two, such as SRV or TXT records. It is clear that any
anonymization policy applied to an RR must be applied to both
the QNAME and RDATA components, as one component can
typically be derived from the other by issuing a new DNS
request, thus breaking the anonymization.
f) Domain name: As described in Section IV, the queried
domain name can be used to fingerprint subscribers, and the
only known anonymization strategy is data minimization. The
authors of [8] suggest two minimization strategies: Omitting
the most or least popular hostnames. From a cyber-security
research perspective, omitting the least popular hostnames
severely decreases data utility. As an example, botnets based
on Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are likely to be
rendered undetectable.
The authors of [8] argue that omitting the most popular
hostnames would have only a limited effect on fingerprinting
risk, though the effect increases when the 500-1000 most
popular hostnames are omitted. However, it is questionable
if this result applies on an ISP network in 2020. The paper
analyses data from approximately 3600 users on a campus
network in 2010, where removing the 1000 most popular
hostnames is equivalent to removing 51,2% of all queries.
Nevertheless, on Telenor Denmark’s network having around
1.7 million subscribers in 2020, the same percentage of queries
relates only to 15 domains and associated subdomains1. This
suggests that significant data minimization (removing > 50%)
could decrease the fingerprinting risk. If the omitted domain
names represent domains that are less interesting from a cyber-
security research perspective, the utility of the data can be
preserved while decreasing the fingerprinting risk.
OS fingerprinting can be avoided using the same technique,
by simply adding known OS-specific domain names and IP
addresses to the list of omitted domains. This includes for ex-
ample captive portal detection mechanisms (such as resolving
”connectivitycheck.gstatic.com”), proxy detection (resolving
the ”wpad” hostname), etc.
C. Pseudo-code: a DNS anonymization policy
The pseudo-code listed in Listing 2 implements the
anonymization policy summarized in Tables V and IV. The
anonymization functions for timestamps and client IP address/-
port (lines 1 and 2) can be found in Listing 1. Line 11 rep-
1Specifically: apple.com, facebook.com, akadns.net, google.com,
googleapis.com, snapchat.com, akamaiedge.net, fbcdn.net, icloud.com,
apple-dns.net, doubleclick.net, gstatic.com, netflix.com, microsoft.com and
googlevideo.com.
Listing 2. DNS anonymization policy.
1 t imes t amp = anon t imes tamp ( t imes t amp )
2 ip , p o r t = a n o n i p p o r t ( ip , p o r t )
3
4 i f h e a d e r . opcode == Query :
5 i f query . c l a s s ==IN and que ry . type in
commonTypes :
6 i f any in commonDomainList in que ry . name :
7 que ry . name = ” ”
8
9 f o r e a c h r r in a n s w e r S e c t i o n s O f P a y l o a d :
10 i f r r . c l a s s ==IN and r r . type in commonTypes :
11 r r . t t l = i n t e g e r B i n n i n g ( l i s t O f I n t e r v a l s )
12 i f any in commonDomainList in r r . name :
13 r r . name = ” ”
14 r r . d a t a = ” ”
15 i f any in commonDomainList in r r . d a t a :
16 r r . name = ” ”
17 r r . d a t a = ” ”
resents the binning of the TTL value, but the implementation
of the function itself is left out for brevity. Lines 5-7 clear
the queried domain name if it matches or is a sub-domain
of the domain names listed in commonDomainList. Lines 12-
17 perform the same operation on the Answer RRs, which
includes searching for the domain name in both the question
(rr.name) and response (rr.data) part of the RR. For brevity,
the Answer payload section is considered to also include the
Additional and Authoritative sections.
The DNS anonymization pseudo-code is clearly more com-
putationally heavy than the NetFlow anonymization pseudo-
code due to the use of string operations. This is to some extent
mitigated by the list of common domains being short.
VII. CONCLUSION
It has previously been unclear what traffic data an ISP has
available for cyber-security research, and under which legal
conditions it can be used. This paper attempts to address this
by presenting relevant legislation and data sources, and by
presenting an anonymization policy for the relevant data.
The EU ePrivacy Directive puts strict requirements on which
data can be used by ISPs. Only data that is already used for the
purpose of transmission can be used for other purposes, and
then only when anonymized. If use of other data and/or use of
data in a non-anonymized form is desired, an explicit consent
from the subscriber is required. We present the relevant data
sources available to a typical ISP, using Telenor Denmark as
example, and argue that DNS and NetFlow data are identified
as relevant to cyber-security research and as technically and
legally available data sources under the condition that the
data is anonymized before further processing. We elaborate
by proposing anonymization policies (in the form of pseudo-
code) for DNS and NetFlow log data.
The proposed anonymization policies make use of various
techniques for generalization, such as truncation of IP ad-
dresses, precision degradation of timestamps, data minimiza-
tion on collected DNS logs etc. as mandated by legislation
and suggested and inferred by best practices and related
work. The pseudo-code implements the anonymization in a
computationally inexpensive way such that application at ISP-
scale traffic rates is possible. The anonymization policies and
related pseudo-code are considered the primary contribution
of this paper, giving researchers and developers a concrete
and technically focused starting point when creating solutions
targeted for deployment in ISPs.
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